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Abstract
The average ﬁrm going public or issuing new equity has underperformed the market
in the long run. Endogeneity of the number of new issues has been proposed as
a potential explanation of this long-run underperformance. Under pseudo market
timing of new issues, ex post measures of average abnormal returns may be negative
on average despite zero ex ante abnormal returns. We show that, under reasonable
stationarity assumptions on the process generating events, traditional measures of
average abnormal returns are consistent, and the pseudo market timing eﬀect is
a small sample problem. In simulations of an empirical model we demonstrate
that the bias is small even in moderate sample sizes. An abnormal return measure
capturing a feasible investment strategy is not biased. We argue that it is unlikely
that pseudo market timing is the explanation for the long-run underperformance in
equity issuances.
Keywords: Abnormal return measures, Endogenous events, Event studies, Initial
public oﬀerings, Long-run underperformance.
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Major corporate events are inherently endogenous. For example, a ﬁrm may decide when
to go public depending on general market conditions. It is well documented that ﬁrms
tend to go public after high underpricing in initial public oﬀerings (IPOs) and after high
market returns. Traditional event study methods, however, treat the timing of events as
exogenous. Event studies have shown that the average ﬁrm going public has underper-
formed the market in the long run. In a recent review, Ritter and Welch (2002) report
an average 23% underperformance (relative to the market) during the three-year period
following a US IPO.1 The lack of an explanation for the long-run underperformance in
IPOs and similar underperformance in seasoned equity oﬀerings (SEOs) has been referred
to as the “new issues puzzle.”
In a recent paper, Schultz (2003) proposes an explanation for the apparent long-run
underperformance of ﬁrms that go public. He argues that the underperformance may
be a statistical illusion caused by the clustering of IPOs after a period of unusually high
abnormal returns on previous IPO ﬁrms. This eﬀect is referred to as pseudo market timing.
Note that it is not genuine market timing ability that is at work, since abnormal returns of
future IPOs are conditionally unpredictable. Instead, when using traditional iid-oriented
event study methods the clustering of events after periods with positive abnormal returns
causes a statistical bias in estimated average abnormal returns. The pseudo market timing
argument, in principal, extends to other endogenous corporate events. For example, SEOs
have also shown a long-run underperformance. Hence, the pseudo market timing argument
appears to have more wide-spread implications than just for IPOs.
In this paper we provide a thorough evaluation of the endogeneity problem in event
studies as it relates to long-run underperformance and undertake both theoretical and
simulation analyses. Measuring and testing abnormal returns when the number of events is
1The long-run underperformance in IPOs was ﬁrst documented by Ritter (1991). Reviews on security
issuance include Eckbo and Masulis (1995), Ibbotson and Ritter (1995), Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001),
Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994), and Ritter (2003).
1endogenous is a non-trivial econometric problem.2 We approach event studies from a time
series perspective, which contrasts to the usual cross-section oriented treatment of event
studies. The time series perspective takes into account the dynamic dependence of events
on past returns and easily incorporates general forms of pseudo market timing. When
reasonable (stationarity) assumptions on the process generating the number of events are
imposed, the traditional cumulative abnormal return measures are not problematic in
large samples. We also consider an abnormal return measure that captures the returns
on a feasible investment strategy in event ﬁrms; this measure is in line with the calendar
time approach advocated by Fama (1998). We show that this abnormal return measure
is unbiased and does not have the problems of the traditional measures—not even in
small samples. Hence, pseudo market timing as a potential explanation for long-run
underperformance is limited to small samples.
To evaluate the potential small sample bias in the traditional measures, we undertake
simulation experiments. As a basis for the simulations, we consider count data regres-
sions where the non-negative integer character of the event data (here IPOs) is explicitly
acknowledged. This makes the empirical model well suited for simulations. We ﬁnd that
pseudo market timing is a small sample problem, and that the bias depends on the pa-
rameters related to persistence in the number of events, impact of market conditions, and
cross-sectional correlations in abnormal returns. An important ﬁnding is that dependence
of the number of IPOs on past market returns is not suﬃcient to generate pseudo market
timing bias; instead, biases are caused by correlation between past abnormal returns and
the number of events. Event abnormal return measures that correct for cross correlations
show much less bias than the usual equally weighted measures. But even for the equally
2Eckbo, Maksimovic, and Williams (1990) discuss exogenous versus endogenous events. Other prob-
lematic issues in measuring long-run abnormal returns relate to the right benchmark model, the use of
average abnormal returns or buy-and-hold returns, the use of value-weighted or equally weighted returns,
corrections for cross-sectional correlations, time-varying market risk, and non-normally distributed ab-
normal returns; see, for instance, Barber and Lyon (1997), Brav (2000), Brav and Gompers (1997), Brav,
Geczy, and Gompers (2000), Eckbo and Norli (2001), Fama (1998), Gompers and Lerner (2003), Kothari
and Warner (1997), Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Mitchell and Staﬀord (2000).
2weighted abnormal return measure, the pseudo market timing eﬀect does not provide suf-
ﬁcient bias to explain the observed long-run underperformance of IPOs in samples of the
size typically used in empirical research. We conclude that it is unlikely that the long-run
underperformance of IPO ﬁrms is explained by pseudo market timing.
Our work relates to two concurrent working papers. Viswanathan and Wei (2004)
study the properties of long-run performance measures with endogenous events. They
use more restrictive assumptions in their theoretical analysis, but show, as we do, that
the cumulative abnormal return measure converges to zero in large samples. In addition,
they calculate the ﬁnite sample expectation of the cumulative abnormal return for a
speciﬁc data generating process for the number of IPOs. The calculations show that
under a stationary process for the number of IPOs the biases in abnormal return measure
are small. Ang, Gu, and Hochberg (2004) conduct simulations and conclude that the
IPO underperformance is highly unlikely to be due to small sample problems in abnormal
return measures.
We start our analysis in Section II by providing examples similar to Schultz (2003).
We then turn to a formal analysis of the event abnormal return measures in Section III.
We present an empirical model for the number of events in Section IV, and report the
simulation results in Section V. We conclude in Section VI.
II Two Examples
We follow Schultz (2003) and analyze the pseudo market timing hypothesis in a two-
period model. Initially we make the same simplifying assumptions as he does; later we
relax one crucial assumption.3 The pseudo market timing eﬀect we consider is couched
in a initial public oﬀering (IPO) setting, but extends to general settings with endogenous
corporate events. The purpose of this section is to show the exact cause of the pseudo
3To focus the discussion on the eﬀects of pseudo market timing, we abstract from problems such as
bad benchmark models, value versus equal weighting of events, non-normality and the like. We do pay
attention to cross-sectional correlations, because it interacts with pseudo market timing.
3market timing eﬀect, and to motivate the use of abnormal return measures that correct
for cross-sectional correlation.
Consider a two-period model. The market return is normalized to zero in both periods.
The idea of pseudo market timing is that more ﬁrms go public when past returns have been
positive. Returns of private ﬁrms (that potentially may go public) and ﬁrms that actually
go public are assumed to follow a simple binomial process. These ﬁrms experience either a
positive or negative 10% return with equal probability (in both periods). Since the market
return is assumed to be zero in both periods, the binomial process also characterizes the
abnormal returns of private ﬁrms and ﬁrms that go public. Let the abnormal return
in period 1 (between date 0 and date 1) be denoted by r1. Similarly, let r2 denote the
abnormal return in period 2 (between date 1 and date 2). According to the binomial
process, the abnormal returns in periods 1 and 2 can take four diﬀerent paths (or four
scenarios, labeled I to IV):
I. r1 = +10% and r2 = +10%;
II. r1 = +10% and r2 = −10%;
III. r1 = −10% and r2 = +10%;
IV. r1 = −10% and r2 = −10%.
The interesting feature of the analysis is that the number of observed IPOs depends
on the past performance. When the price in period 1 is higher than the initial price, more
IPOs are observed. Conversely, a lower price leads to fewer IPOs. Suppose the number
of IPOs in the beginning of the ﬁrst period, known at date 0, is one (that is, N0 = 1).
If a positive (abnormal) return is observed in period 1, the number of IPOs increases
to, say, three (that is, N1 = 3). It is important to recognize that the number of IPOs
is a function of past returns, but not contemporaneous or future returns. The assumed
number of IPOs in period 2 (here three) is not important for the reasoning; it could be
any positive number larger than one. Suppose now instead that the return in period 1 is
4negative, then the number of IPOs decreases to zero (that is, N1 = 0). [Below, we relax
Schultz’s (2003) assumption that the number of IPOs is zero. It turns out that this is
important for the analysis.] Panel A in Table I summarizes the four scenarios with the
abnormal returns and the number of IPOs.
The table also reports three measures of average abnormal returns. The ﬁrst measure
is an equally weighted abnormal return measure, denoted AREW. It simply averages
the observed abnormal returns in a scenario. This is the measure that Schultz (2003)
focuses on. The second measure, denoted ARCW, is an extension of the equally weighted
measure, and corrects for the cross-sectional dependence in the abnormal returns. In the
correction for cross-sectional dependence, all event returns in the same period are counted
as one observation. The third measure is a feasible investment abnormal return measure,
denoted ARFI. It captures the per-period return on a feasible investment strategy that
invests in a portfolio of event ﬁrms in each period. If there is no event in a period, the
investment is in the benchmark (here the market) and the abnormal return for that period
is by construction equal to zero. This measure captures the essential idea of Fama’s (1998)
calendar time abnormal returns by creating a portfolio of all event ﬁrms within a single
investment period.
Table I shows that the unconditional expectations of the ﬁrst two measures of average
abnormal returns (the AREW and ARCW measures) are negative (–3.75% and –2.5%), that
is, they are both biased downwards. It is also more likely that a negative, rather than
a positive measure of abnormal returns is uncovered. These observations are Schultz’s
(2003) main points. He refers to this as pseudo market timing—despite the ex ante
expectation of zero abnormal returns, it is likely that a negative measure of abnormal
returns is observed ex post. It is driven by the fact that the number of IPOs is determined
by past returns. It is further claimed that this pseudo market timing is not a small sample
issue. The ARFI measure is, however, zero. Recall that this measure captures a feasible
investment strategy, where the investment is in all IPOs in a period. If there are multiple
5IPOs, the investment is divided equally over the event ﬁrms. Also, if there are no IPOs in
a period, the investment is in the market. This measure yields a zero average abnormal
return, which is what should be expected from the zero ex ante abnormal returns.
The setting above is special and restrictive in the sense that after one negative ab-
normal return, there are no more IPOs. Consider instead a less drastic assumption and
let the number of IPOs decline, but remain positive, after a negative abnormal return.
For example, start with two IPOs in period 1 (that is, N0 = 2). Then, after a positive
abnormal return in period 1, the number of IPOs doubles and after a negative abnormal
return it halves (that is, N1 = 4 or N1 = 1 depending on the return in period 1). Panel
B in Table I summarizes the four scenarios with the abnormal return measures.
We now observe a diﬀerent picture. The AREW measure is still biased downwards, but
the ARCW measure is unbiased. Note that the key diﬀerence with the previous example
is the number of IPOs in scenarios III and IV. In Panel A, scenarios III and IV show
no IPOs in period 2, hence the abnormal return in period 2 is not taken into account in
these scenarios. In Panel B, there is still one IPO in period 2. This observation exactly
oﬀsets the negative abnormal return in period 1 if the abnormal return measure corrects
for cross-sectional dependence. The ARFI measure is again unbiased. That the abnormal
return in period 2 is not observed in Panel A is not a problem for the ARFI measure
as the investment strategy is then to invest in the benchmark, yielding a zero abnormal
return. Still, this observation is taken into account in the per-period average.
That cross-sectional dependence for computing average abnormal returns is problem-
atic has been noticed in several studies (including Brav, 2000, and Mitchell and Staﬀord,
2000). Fama (1998) argues that a better way of gauging abnormal returns is to construct
portfolios representing investments in all feasible events in a period and then evaluate the
performance of such a strategy in the time series. Note that in the examples above, such
a measure is similar to our ARCW and ARFI measures. Depending on how periods with
no events are treated it coincides with either ARCW or ARFI. If it is assumed that there
6is no investment at all in periods with no IPOs, it coincides with ARCW. If it is assumed
that the investment is in the benchmark when there are no events, it coincides with ARFI.
Finally, note that it is only the ARFI measure that is unbiased in both examples.
III Abnormal Return Measures and Sampling Properties
In this section we derive formal sampling properties of abnormal return measures. We
ﬁrst formalize the way cumulative abnormal return measures are calculated, and then
discuss unbiasedness (a small sample property) and consistency (a large sample property)
of the measures in relation to endogenous event timing. Finally, we consider a feasible
investment abnormal return measure and its sampling properties.
A Cumulative Abnormal Return Measures
Consider a sample period of length T + K, where Nt denotes the number of events in
period t. We assume the events are realized at the end of the period, so Nt ∈ Ωt, for
t = 1,..,T. The abnormal returns on the event ﬁrms, ri,t+k, are realized in periods t + 1
through t + K. We are interested in measuring the average abnormal return on event
ﬁrms up to K periods after the event period.
Consider the abnormal return measures from the previous section. The equally weighted











This expression sums up the abnormal returns over all events in all time periods, and then
divides by the total number of events. It is a traditional abnormal return measure. An


























This measure is simply an equally weighted average abnormal return for the cumulative
7abnormal returns
PK
k=1 ri,t+k in ﬁrm i.
The measure with correction for cross-sectional dependence ﬁrst averages the abnormal
returns within each period, and then averages the resulting numbers over all time periods.





























t=1 I[Nt > 0]
, (4)
where I[.] is an indicator function (the value is one if Nt > 0, and zero otherwise). Like



















t=1 I[Nt > 0]
. (5)
Again, this is simply a cross-sectionally weighted average abnormal return applied to the
individual cumulative abnormal returns.
We now assess the properties of the cumulative abnormal return measures. To ﬁx the
idea, start with the case of purely exogenous timing of events. Formally, we assume that









= 0. Under the exogenous market
timing assumption one can easily show that both cumulative abnormal return measures
are unbiased (i.e., E(CAREW) = 0 and E(CARCW) = 0). In contrast to the exogenous
event situation, the number of events in the pseudo market timing case is endogenous and
correlated with past abnormal returns. We therefore cannot set the expectations of ri,t
conditional on the full time series of the number of observations N1,...,NT to zero. In
this case, we generally cannot deliver a proof of unbiasedness.4 We are therefore left with
4The problem is that in both expressions for these estimators, we divide by a function of Nt, which is
8considering large sample properties of these two measures.
To assess the large sample properties, we exploit the assumption that abnormal returns
have expectation zero conditional on all previous information (i.e., we assess whether
these estimators are unbiased under the null that E(ri,t|Ωt−1) = 0, where Ωt−1 denotes
information available at time t−1). This is exactly the assumption Schultz (2003) makes.
This assumption captures the key idea of market eﬃciency and excludes genuine market
timing of abnormal returns (predictive ability of abnormal returns).
We show that the cumulative average abnormal return measures converge in large
samples to zero (that is, we prove consistency in all cases). The proof for the equally















where n is the long-run average number of events per period. It is assumed that
















k=1 ri,t+k|2 < Q < ∞ for some Q.5
Condition (i) rules out processes that die out over time (i.e., processes where the number
of events over time almost surely converges to zero). Condition (ii) rules out processes
where the number of events grows without bound. Combined, these two conditions guar-
antee that the event process is stable (stationary) over time. The martingale diﬀerence
property in condition (ii) is implied by the null hypothesis E(ri,t|Ωt−1) = 0. Using the







= 0 follows immediately.
For the cross-sectionally weighted average abnormal return measure, we ﬁnd a similar
not independent of the abnormal returns in the numerator, and conditioning on past information only is
not possible.



















where p is the long-run average fraction of time periods with at least one event. It is
assumed that












Q < ∞ for some Q.
Again, condition (i) guarantees that the event process does not die out (i.e., the number
of events does not converge to zero). Condition (ii) is again implied by the null and is
slightly weaker than the condition for the consistency of the equally weighted average
abnormal return measure. Both conditions seem reasonable in a stationary environment.
The consistency results imply that, although possibly biased in small samples, event
studies using the equally weighted abnormal return measure or the cross-sectionally
weighted abnormal return measure give consistent estimates in large samples. Hence,
we ﬁnd that the possible bias of the equally weighted average abnormal return measure is
only a small sample problem. Our conclusion contradicts Schultz’s (2003) statements and
seems at odds with the results of his multi-period simulations. We conjecture that his
simulations violate the stationarity condition we impose above. His simulations increase
the number of events after a price increase, and decrease the number of events after a
price decrease. As Schultz (2003) states, this is reminiscent of a doubling strategy. The
problem with such a process is that the unconditional variance of the number of events Nt
grows without bound over time. As a result, his simulations violate condition (ii) which
requires the variance of the sum of abnormal returns to be bounded.
10B A Feasible Investment Abnormal Return Measure
Fama (1998) suggests an alternative measure of the event eﬀect, captured by the return
on a feasible investment strategy in the event ﬁrms. For every time period t, deﬁne the
excess return (over a benchmark) on an investment strategy in all ﬁrms that had an event















The indicator function I[.] implies that if there are no events in the period (t−K,...,t−1),
the feasible investment return equals zero, reﬂecting an investment in the benchmark. The










This measure reﬂects the averages per period return on an investment strategy in events
in the previous K periods. To compare the excess return with the cumulative abnormal
returns, the ARFI measure has to be multiplied by K (the length of the event window).
It is straightforward to show the unbiasedness of the measure capturing a feasible
investment strategy. Recall that the abnormal investment return in a period is the cross-
sectional average of abnormal return. Unbiasedness follows from the fact that this abnor-























where the second equality follows from the conditional independence of Nt−k and ri,t.































t = 0, (12)
where we use that rFI
t is a martingale diﬀerence sequence with ﬁnite variance. For this
to hold, we need essentially the same conditions as for the consistency of the cumulative
abnormal return measure CARCW.
IV Data and Empirical Model
In this section we ﬁt an empirical model of the number of IPOs to actual data. We
ﬁrst describe the data used, then discuss and estimate the model, and ﬁnally provide
simulation evidence.
A Data Description
We study the eﬀects of market conditions on the number of IPOs using U.S. data. The
sample period is January 1960 to June 2003, yielding 522 monthly observations. Data on
the number of IPOs in a month, denoted Nt, are taken from the web pages of Jay Ritter.6
We consider two variables that proxy for market conditions: returns on the S&P 500 index
and average initial underpricing in IPOs. They are denoted by Rm,t and Ru,t. The S&P
500 returns are from Ibbotson Associates; the data on initial underpricing are taken from
the web pages of Jay Ritter. The initial underpricing variable is the equally weighted
initial underpricing across all IPOs in a month. An individual initial underpricing is
measured as the percentage change in the closing price within a month from the IPO oﬀer
price.7
Figure I shows the number of IPOs aggregated into a quarter together with monthly
6The number of oﬀerings excludes Regulation A oﬀerings, REITs, and close-end funds, but includes
ADRs. The web pages of Jay Ritter give a detailed description with references to data sources.
7The deﬁnition of underpricing varies somewhat in the sample as described in Ibbotson and Jaﬀe
(1975), Ritter (1984), and updates of Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1988, 1994) at Jay Ritter’s web
pages.
12observations of the log of cumulative returns (labeled log of market index in the ﬁgure)
and the initial underpricing. There are four distinct periods of relatively low IPO activity
(1963-67, 1973-79, 1988-90, and 2001 to the end of the sample). Consequently, there
are also four periods of relatively high IPO activity (up to and including 1962, 1968-72,
1980-87, and 1991-2000). In each of the low activity periods the annual number of IPOs
was well below 240 (a monthly average of less 20 IPOs), whereas the annual number of
IPOs in high activity periods ranges from 238 to 953. It is evident from the ﬁgure that
immediately before a period of low IPO activity there are severe falls in equity values. It
is also evident that there is clustering in the initial underpricing. Further, it seems as a
large underpricing is followed by a period of high IPO activity. However, the most recent
period of low IPO activity (after a dramatic fall in prices in aftermath of the internet
boom) is preceded by a period of large initial underpricing.
Table II presents summary statistics of the three variables. The total number of IPOs
in the sample is 14,860. The average and median number of IPOs in a month is 28.5 and
22. The number of IPOs in a month varies a lot (the standard deviation is 24.7); there
are 18 months with no IPOs, and the maximum number of IPOs in a month is 122. Note
that the variance is much larger than the mean, which for count data is referred to as
overdispersion. The average return on the S&P 500 is about 0.91% per month (10.9%
annualized). The standard deviation is about 4.34% per month (15.0% annualized). The
average initial underpricing is 18.1%, but it ranges between a minimum of -28.8% and a
maximum of 119.1% (also seen in Figure I). The median underpricing is about 13%.
From the returns on S&P 500 and initial underpricing, we compute 12-month moving
average series. They are denoted R12
m,t and R12
u,t. We will use the 12-month moving averages
in the count data regressions below to capture general market conditions in the previous
year.
13B An Empirical Model of the Number of IPOs
To study the eﬀects of market conditions on the number of IPOs we use count data
regressions. We explicitly acknowledge the non-negative integer character of the data
(the number of IPOs in a month). This non-negativity is, in general, a concern for the
ﬁtted values of the number of IPOs, and, in particular, a concern for simulations of the
number of IPOs. The empirical model is a count regression model and has two major
components, ﬁrst a distributional assumption, and second a speciﬁcation of the mean
parameter as a function of explanatory variables. This makes the model well suited for
simulations.8
The basic Poisson regression model in the time series assumes that the occurrence of
event counts (here the number of IPOs in a month Nt) conditional on variables known at






, Nt = 0,1,2,..., (13)
where µ(xt−1) > 0 is the intensity or rate parameter that completely determines the
density. It is well known that the ﬁrst two central moments of the Poisson distribution
are equal, that is,
E(Nt|xt−1) = Var(Nt|xt−1) = µ(xt−1). (14)
This equality of the mean and variance is referred to as equidispersion. When the variance
is a larger (smaller) than the mean, we have overdispersion (underdispersion).
Empirically, overdispersion is common (for example, we have noted that the number
of IPOs is unconditionally overdispersed). To allow for overdispersion, we let the number
of IPOs in a month be drawn from the mixing of a Poisson distribution and a gamma
8Indeed, predicted values in Schultz (2003) are negative in some periods (see his Figure 1). Simulated











Nt|xt−1,ηt ∼ Poisson[ηtµt (xt−1)], (16)
where ηt is drawn from a gamma distribution with a unit mean and a variance equal to σ2
η.
The error term ηt is a multiplicative error term that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity
in the data over time. It is straightforward to show that conditional mean and variance
are now
E(Nt|xt−1) = µ(xt−1), (17)




These moments are equal to the mean and variance of the negative binomial II model in
Cameron and Trivedi (1986), and extensively discussed in Cameron and Trivedi (1998)
and Winkelmann (2003).
The Poisson regression model is derived from the Poisson distribution by parameteriz-
ing the relation between the mean parameter and its regressors. Consider the exponential
mean parameterization
E(Nt|xt−1) = µ(xt−1) = exp(β
0xt−1), t = 1,2,...,T, (19)
where β and xt−1 are both vectors with dimension l. The vector of regressors xt−1 may
include a constant term. As described in detail below, we include functions of lagged
number of IPOs, lagged market returns, and lagged initial underpricing in xt−1.
We use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) of Hansen (1982) to estimate
parameters. We consider the following moment conditions:
E([Nt − exp(β












15The parameter vector β is identiﬁed in the ﬁrst l moment conditions (20), and σ2
η is iden-
tiﬁed in the last moment condition (21).9 Together this is an exactly identiﬁed system
with l + 1 equations and l + 1 parameters. In practice the moments are replaced with
their sample counterparts.10 Note that the Poisson regression model is intrinsically het-
eroskedastic, and GMM provides a consistent covariance matrix robust to autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity.
We consider model speciﬁcations where the number of IPOs is a function of past
number of IPOs (similar to an autoregressive model) and measures of market conditions.
The following is our base line speciﬁcation:
E(Nt|Nt−1,Rm,t−1) = exp






where Rm,t−1 is the lagged S&P 500 return and N∗
t−1 = max(d,Nt−1). The value 0 <
d < 1 in the max operator prevents potential problems in taking the logarithm when
Nt−1 = 0. We let d = 0.5, but experimenting with diﬀerent values reveals that the







the model could otherwise explode (see, Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). We also consider
speciﬁcations with alternatives to the market return as a proxy for market conditions
(initial underpricing, and the 12-month moving averages of market returns and initial
underpricing), and speciﬁcations where more lags of the number of IPOs are included.
The main results from the count data regressions are presented in Table III. Speciﬁ-
cation (i) shows that the measured coeﬃcient on the lagged S&P 500 returns is about
1.4 and statistically signiﬁcant at usual signiﬁcance levels. The interpretation is that a
1% point increase in the current month’s return leads to a 1.4% increase in the expected
9Alternative ways of identifying σ2
η (see, for instance, Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon, 1984) yield
similar estimates. See also Hall, Griliches, and Hausman (1986) for an application.
10Another natural estimator is maximum likelihood (ML). It turns out that the set of sample moment
conditions related to (20) equals the score of the log likelihood function for the ML estimator of the
basic Poisson model, and GMM and ML yield identical point estimates. It is well known that as long as
the conditional mean is correctly speciﬁed the estimates are consistent even if the Poisson distribution
assumption is not appropriate.
16number of IPOs in the next month. Speciﬁcations with the lagged initial underpricing
(ii) or a lagged 12-month moving average of S&P 500 returns (iii) show signiﬁcant coef-
ﬁcients as well. The market condition in the last 12 months is particular important for
the number of IPOs. Speciﬁcation (iii) suggests that a year with a one 1% point increase
in the average S&P 500 return is followed by a month with an 8.4% expected increase
in the number of IPOs. The eﬀect of market conditions on the number of IPOs seems
economically signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on a lagged 12-month moving average of initial
underpricing in speciﬁcation (iv) is only marginal signiﬁcant (a p-value of 6%). We also
run speciﬁcations with multiple measures of market conditions. The results in speciﬁca-
tion (v) suggest that the lagged S&P 500 return as well as the lagged initial underpricing
is important; they are both signiﬁcant at usual signiﬁcance levels. The results in speciﬁ-
cations (vi) and (vii) indicate that the 12-month moving average of S&P 500 returns is
the main driver of the results.
In all speciﬁcations the measured coeﬃcients on the lagged number of IPOs indicate
a high degree of persistence in the number of IPOs—the coeﬃcients are in the range
0.79 to 0.84. We also estimate models with further lags of the number of IPOs. The
results are reported in Table IV. The coeﬃcients on additional lags are often signiﬁcant,
however, the sum of the coeﬃcients on the lags are less than 0.85 in all speciﬁcations.
Importantly, the inclusion of further lags does not considerably aﬀect the estimates on the
measures of market conditions. The R-square measures do not strongly favor a particular
speciﬁcation, though it is important to include at least one lag of the number of IPOs.
Following Lowry (2003) and P´ astor and Veronesi (2004), we also consider speciﬁcations
with a dummy for observations in the ﬁrst quarter of a year. We do not ﬁnd any evidence
in favor of a quarterly seasonality. However, speciﬁcations with monthly dummies for
January, February, and March show that (conditionally) there are signiﬁcantly fewer
IPOs in January.
In sum, we show that current market conditions have information about the number
17of IPOs in the future. This is consistent with the idea of pseudo market timing. Next we
use the empirical model to simulate from.
V Simulation Evidence
We have shown that the abnormal return measure that captures a feasible investment
strategy is unbiased under pseudo market timing. In order to assess the small sample
performance of the other two average abnormal return measures (the equally weighted
abnormal return measure and the measure that takes into account cross-sectional depen-
dence), we undertake simulation experiments. The basis of the simulations is the empirical
model for the number of IPOs ﬁtted in the previous section.
A Simulation Set-Up
The steps in the experiments are:
1. The data generating process of market returns.
Monthly market returns are drawn (with replacement) from the actual S&P 500
returns. Based on the sampled monthly market returns, 12-month moving averages
are constructed. The sample size varies in diﬀerent simulations (100, 200, or 500
observations).
2. The data generating process of abnormal returns.
The following error components model is used for abnormal returns
ˆ ri,t = ct + i,t (23)
where ct ∼ N(0,σ2ρ) and i,t ∼ N(0,σ2(1 − ρ)). The cumulative abnormal return
for any time period and ﬁrm is then given by
PK





This error component model implies an interesting correlation structure for the
cumulative abnormal returns. It is straightforward to show that the variance of
18the cumulative return is Kσ2 and the cross-sectional covariance is Kσ2ρ. The
correlation between two cumulative abnormal returns is then ρ, independent of the
cumulation horizon K. The parameters σ and ρ are set to match empirical estimates
in Brav (2000) and Mitchell and Staﬀord (2000) of the cross-sectional correlation in
abnormal returns and the variance of abnormal returns. Initially we pick ρ = 2.6%
and σ = 17%.
3. The data generating process of number of IPOs
We consider two alternative processes of the number of IPOs. The ﬁrst alternative
conditions on the time series of 12-month moving averages and uses the empirical
model directly to generate a time series of the number of IPOs (denoted ˆ Nt). The
initial number of IPOs is drawn from a Poisson distribution with an unconditional
intensity parameter equal to exp

ˆ β0+ˆ β1ˆ µm
1−ˆ β2

, approximated from equation (22) with
ˆ µm being the average market return and ˆ β0, ˆ β1, and ˆ β2 being estimated parameters.
This generates about 30 IPOs for the ﬁrst month, close to the unconditional average
number of IPOs per month in the sample. For subsequent observations we have
the following structure: a multiplicative error term is ﬁrst drawn from a gamma
distribution with unit mean and variance ˆ σ2
η; then the number of IPOs is drawn from
a Poisson distribution with a conditional mean (based on the estimated parameters
ˆ β, and lagged number of IPOs and 12-month moving average return) times the
multiplicative error term. Parameter estimates from speciﬁcation (iii) in Table III
are used as default parameters.
The second alternative data generating process uses the same structure as the ﬁrst
alternative, but allows the lagged common component of the abnormal returns ct to
aﬀect the future number of IPOs. This will impose a pseudo market timing eﬀect in
the model, since the number of IPOs is aﬀected by the abnormal IPO returns in the
19previous period. The equation for the number of IPOs then contains the expression
β
0xt−1 = β0 + β1Rm,t−1 + β2 ln(N
∗
t−1) + β3ct−1. (24)
However, since we did not include the lagged common IPO return component in the
empirical model (as it is unobserved), we have to assume a particular value for the
coeﬃcient β3. In the simulations, we pick values so that the eﬀect of market and
previous IPO returns are in the same order of magnitude.
4. The average abnormal return measures.
















































These calculations correspond to Equations (2), (5), and (9) above. We consider
cumulative returns with horizons of 1, 36, and 60 months. To make the monthly fea-
sible investment returns comparable to the K-month cumulative abnormal returns,
we multiply ARFI by K in all the tables.
The four steps above are repeated 1,000, 2,500, or 5,000 times (depending on the length of
the series simulated). The averages of the generated measures are reported. We also report
Monte Carlo standard errors of the averages, constructed from the standard deviation of
the generated abnormal return measures.
B Simulation Results
Table V reports the results of our simulations when the generating process of the number
of IPOs exactly follows the empirical model above (ı.e. β3 = 0). The table shows bias
20estimates of the three abnormal return measures CAREW, CARCW, and ARFI expressed
in % over the horizons of 1, 36, and 60 months. We consider four parameter set-ups.
Panel A shows the results for the default case where parameters is from speciﬁcation (iii)
in Table III. Further, the cross-correlation in abnormal returns is set to 2.6% and the
standard deviation of the abnormal returns is set to 17% per month. The magnitudes
of the reported biases are economically small (less than 0.16% in absolute value in the
60-months period). There is no tendency for an overall negative or positive bias. Indeed,
no reported bias is larger than its Monte Carlo standard error (given below the bias and
within parenthesis).
To see how sensitive the results are to the chosen parameter values, we presents sim-
ulations where we expect to get signiﬁcant biases. Panel B shows the results where the
persistence in the event generating process is higher (the coeﬃcient on the lagged number
of IPOs is increased from 0.8 to 0.95); Panel C shows the results where the coeﬃcient
on lagged 12-month moving average returns is doubled (from 8.438 to 16.876) in addition
to the higher persistence; Panel D shows results where the cross-sectional correlations in
abnormal returns is increased (from 2.6% to 15%). All augmented set-ups reveal the same
result: there is no bias in the abnormal return measures.
Table VI reports the results of our simulations when we allow the lagged common
component of the abnormal returns ct to aﬀect the future number of IPOs. We do this by
choosing β3 = 5 as the default value; this choice makes the variance of β3ct approximately
equal to the variance of β1Rm,t. We consider again four parameter set-ups. Panels A
(default) and B (high persistence) follow the set-ups in the previous table and show a
consistently negative bias for the equally weighted measure due to the pseudo market
timing. However, the magnitudes are small. The cross-sectional corrected measure and
the measure of the feasible investment strategy show now biases. In Panel C, the impact
of the lagged common component is set to 10 and together with high persistence the bias
for the equally weighted measure is larger (about 2% over a 60-month horizon). In Panel
21D the cross-sectional correlations is set at 15% and the equally weighted measure now
show a bias of about 6% over a 60-month horizon. The bias is signiﬁcantly negative for
the equally weighted measure; the largest bias is -6% for the 60-month horizon and 100
observations, which is still quite much less than the underperformance of IPO ﬁrms found
in most empirical studies. Panels C and D also reveal that the cross-sectional corrected
measure and the measure of the feasible investment strategy show almost no biases.
To conclude, in our simulations we ﬁnd no or only small biases in the average abnormal
return measures. It is crucial to have a correlation between IPO returns and the process
for the number of IPOs in order to generate a pseudo market timing eﬀect. Based on our
results, pseudo market timing does not seem to be a problem in sample sizes typically
used in empirical work on IPO underperformance.
C A Comparison with Other Studies
How can we reconcile our results with Schultz’s (2003) results? A critical assumption in
the simulations is that the event generating process is stationary. We explicitly acknowl-
edge that the number of IPOs in a month is a non-negative integer; we also allow for
high persistence in the process, though the process cannot be absorbed at zero and does
not explode. The key in Schultz (2003) is that the simulations violate the stationarity
assumptions made above. However, then the probability limit of the abnormal return
estimator is not well deﬁned. Several studies, including Lowry (2003), Schultz (2004)
and Viswanathan and Wei (2004) have tested for a unit-root in the level of the number of
IPOs, but these tests seem inconclusive. We do not ﬁnd it economically plausible that the
process is exploding or have an absorbing state at zero. Recall that if we let the process
be near-integrated but still stationary (the autoregressive coeﬃcient is set to 0.95), there
is still not a bias in typical sample sizes.
Schultz (2004) argues that there is a bias in the traditional equally weighted measure
even when the data generating process is stationary. We ﬁnd this odd. Looking closer at
22the way he generates abnormal returns, we ﬁnd that his seemingly uncorrelated abnormal
returns (i) share a common market component that induces cross-sectional correlations in
abnormal returns, and (ii) contain a complex dependence structure with market returns
and the number of IPOs. To see this, consider the way IPO returns are generated:
Ri,t = a + βi,mRm,t + νi,t, Rm,t ∼ N(µm,σ
2
m), νi,t ∼ N(0,σ
2
ν), (28)
where a = −0.43695 is a constant term, βi = 1.4634 is the estimated beta in a market
model regression, µm = 0.94293% is the market mean return, σ2
m = 0.002254 is the market
variance, and σ2
ν = 0.002631 is the residual variance in the market model regression. The
abnormal return is then given by
ri,t = Ri,t − Rm,t = a + (βi,m − 1)Rm,t + νi,t. (29)
Note that the constant a is chosen such that the abnormal return is forced to have an
expected value of zero, that is, E(ri,t) = 0. However, abnormal returns share a market
component. It is straightforward to show that the cross-sectional correlation between the











Plugging in the values yields a cross-sectional correlation of 15%, which is much higher
than what data suggest; Brav (2000) and Mitchell and Staﬀord (2000) report cross-
correlations close to zero (about 2% to 3%). In addition, the common component of
abnormal returns in equation (29) equals (βi,m − 1)Rm,t and is therefore perfectly corre-
lated with the market returns. These market returns also determine the number of IPOs
in future periods. Hence, Schultz’s (2004) simulations contain a complex dependence
structure between market returns, number of IPOs, and abnormal returns.
23VI Conclusion
Returning to the question in the title of paper whether pseudo market timing is a fact or
ﬁction, the answer is that in theory there may be a bias, but that the bias is small and
negligible for typical sample sizes. An abnormal return measure that captures a feasible
investment strategy exhibits no bias at all. For other, maybe more traditional, measures, it
is a small sample problem that disappears in large samples (yielding consistent measures).
However, even in moderate sample sizes, the bias is small. Based on this, it seems unlikely
that the long-run underperformance of ﬁrms going public or issuing equity is explained
by pseudo market timing.
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27Table I: Analysis of Average Abnormal Returns in Two-Period Examples
Number of IPOs and Abnormal Returns Abnormal Return Measures
Scenario N0 r1 N1 r2 AREW ARCW ARFI
Panel A. Example with Zero IPOs after a Negative Return
I 1 +10% 3 +10% +10% +10% +10%
II 1 +10% 3 –10% –5% 0% 0%
III 1 –10% 0 +10% –10% –10% –5%
IV 1 –10% 0 –10% –10% –10% –5%
Average –3.75% –2.5% 0%
Panel B. Example with Non-Zero IPOs after a Negative Return
I 2 +10% 4 +10% +10% +10% +10%
II 2 +10% 4 –10% –3.33% 0% 0%
III 2 –10% 1 +10% –3.33% 0% 0%
IV 2 –10% 1 –10% –10% –10% –10%
Average –1.67% 0% 0%
This table presents the abnormal return measures in four scenarios (labeled I to IV) of the two-
period examples. N0 and N1 refer to the number of events in periods 1 and 2 (known at dates 0
and 1). r1 and r2 refer to the abnormal returns in periods 1 and 2. AREW denotes the equally
weighted average abnormal return measure. It sums up the abnormal returns over all events in all
time periods, and then divides by the total number of events. ARCW corrects for the fact that there
is cross-sectional dependence in the abnormal returns. It counts all events in the same period as
one observation. ARFI denotes the average per-period return on a feasible investment strategy that
invests in a portfolio of event ﬁrms in each period (if there is no event in a period, the abnormal
return for that period is equal to zero).
28Table II: Summary Statistics
Number of IPOs Return on S&P 500 Initial Underpricing
Statistic Nt Rm,t Ru,t
Mean 28.5 0.91 18.11
Median 22 1.07 13.15
Std.Dev. 24.7 4.34 21.31
Minimum 0 -21.52 -28.80
Maximum 122 16.57 119.10
This table presents summary statistics of monthly observations of the number of
IPOs in a month (Nt), S&P 500 returns (Rm,t), and the average initial underpricing
in IPOs in a month (Ru,t). The sample period is January 1960 to June 2003,
yielding 522 observations. The number of months with zero IPOs is 18 (or 3.5% of
all observations). The moments of Rm,t and Ru,t are expressed in % per month.
29Table III: Empirical Models of the Number of IPOs in a Month
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Moment Conditions (20)
Constant 0.554 0.517 0.615 0.542 0.514 0.599 0.573
(0.069) (0.071) (0.073) (0.071) (0.074) (0.073) (0.077)
Rm,t−1 1.384 1.256 0.849
(0.546) (0.529) (0.560)
Ru,t−1 0.228 0.197 0.074
(0.094) (0.089) (0.125)
R12
m,t−1 8.438 8.335 6.988
(1.736) (1.759) (1.832)
R12
u,t−1 0.192 0.167 0.109
(0.103) (0.101) (0.157)
ln(N∗
t−1) 0.845 0.847 0.800 0.842 0.846 0.795 0.804
(0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (0.019) (0.023) (0.024)
Moment Condition (21)
σ2
η 0.309 0.309 0.297 0.309 0.307 0.297 0.297
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Diagnostics
R-square I 0.793 0.792 0.803 0.794 0.795 0.803 0.895
R-square II 0.867 0.867 0.876 0.868 0.868 0.876 0.876
T 521 521 510 510 521 510 510
This table presents results of count data regressions for the number of IPOs in the U.S. (Nt) for the
period January 1960 to June 2003. Lagged S&P 500 returns (Rm,t−1), lagged initial underpricing
(Ru,t−1), 12-month moving averages of S&P 500 returns (R12
m,t−1) and initial underpricing (R12
u,t−1),
and functions of lagged number of IPOs (N∗
t−1 = max(0.5,Nt−1)) are used as regressors. The initial
underpricing variable is set to zero when there are no IPOs in a month. Sample counterparts to
moment conditions (20) and (21) in the text are used to identify parameters:












autocorrelation consistent standard errors are shown within parentheses below the point estimates.
R-square I refers to the pseudo R-square in Cameron and Trivedi (1986) for the basic Poisson
model. R-square II refers to the squared correlation coeﬃcient between the number of IPOs and
the predicted value. T refers to the number of observations used in the count regression.
30Table IV: Empirical Models of the Number of IPOs in a Month: Robustness
(viii) (ix) (x) (xi)
Moment Conditions (20)
Constant 0.615 0.553 0.503 0.459
(0.073) (0.068) (0.068) (0.073)
R12
m,t−1 8.438 8.310 8.879 9.926
(1.736) (1.730) (1.816) (1.961)
ln(N∗
t−1) 0.800 0.624 0.573 0.531
(0.023) (0.041) (0.046) (0.051)
ln(N∗
















η 0.297 0.293 0.285 0.281
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
Diagnostics
R-square I 0.803 0.811 0.820 0.825
R-square II 0.876 0.879 0.884 0.886
T 510 510 510 510
This table presents results of count data regressions for the
number of IPOs in the U.S. (Nt) on lagged S&P 500 12-month
moving averages of S&P 500 returns (R12
m,t−1) and functions
of lagged number of IPOs (N∗
t−1 = max(0.5,Nt−1)) for the pe-
riod January 1960 to June 2003. Sample counterparts to mo-
ment conditions (20) and (21) in the text are used to identify
parameters. See also the note in Table III. Heteroskedastic and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors are shown within
parentheses below the point estimates. R-square I refers to
the pseudo R-square in Cameron and Trivedi (1986) for the
basic Poisson model. R-square II refers to the squared correla-
tion coeﬃcient between the number of IPOs and the predicted
value. T refers to the number of observations used in the count
regression.
31Table V: Simulation Results, Biases with No Pseudo Market Timing Eﬀect
1-Month Horizon 36-Month Horizon 60-Month Horizon
Measure 100 200 500 100 200 500 100 200 500
Panel A. Default Case
CAREW 0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.08 –0.04 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.22) (0.24) (0.25)
CARCW –0.00 –0.00 0.01 –0.12 –0.12 –0.09 0.13 0.08 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24)
ARFI –0.01 –0.00 –0.01 –0.04 –0.08 0.03 –0.00 0.10 –0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.17) (0.21) (0.23)
Panel B. High Persistence
CAREW –0.01 –0.01 0.02 0.34 –0.01 0.01 0.45 0.26 –0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.19) (0.21) (0.24) (0.28) (0.32)
CARCW –0.00 0.00 0.01 0.31 0.01 –0.01 0.37 0.03 0.07
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24)
ARFI 0.01 0.02 –0.01 0.23 –0.11 –0.07 0.17 –0.25 0.39
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.18) (0.21) (0.23)
Panel C. High Persistence and Large Market Impact
CAREW –0.01 0.01 0.00 0.27 –0.27 0.22 0.27 0.16 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.18) (0.22) (0.27) (0.26) (0.31) (0.38)
CARCW –0.03 –0.00 0.01 0.02 –0.26 0.01 0.21 0.16 –0.19
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.25) (0.26) (0.25)
ARFI –0.01 0.01 0.01 0.11 –0.21 0.04 0.01 0.03 –0.25
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.22) (0.23)
Panel D. High Persistence and Extreme Cross-Correlations
CAREW –0.00 0.01 0.00 –0.28 –0.15 –0.03 –0.55 0.05 0.80
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.27) (0.32) (0.37) (0.39) (0.47) (0.55)
CARCW 0.00 0.00 –0.01 –0.20 –0.02 0.03 –0.44 –0.30 0.43
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.37) (0.39) (0.40)
ARFI 0.01 0.01 –0.01 –0.19 –0.02 0.11 –0.06 –0.29 –0.42
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) (0.29) (0.36) (0.38)
This table presents the average biases of the equally weighted cumulative abnormal return measure
(CAREW), the cross-sectionally weighted cumulative abnormal return measure (CARCW), and the
average abnormal return in the feasible investment strategy (ARFI) in simulations of an empirical
model for the number of IPOs. The biases are expressed in % over the horizon of 1, 36, and 60 months
with three diﬀerent sample sizes (100, 200, and 500 months). The number of replications are 5,000,
2,500, and 1,000 for the three sample sizes. Below each bias estimate the standard error is given
within parenthesis. There are four diﬀerent set-ups. Panel A presents results for the default case.
Parameters for the conditional mean is from speciﬁcation (iii) in Table III. The cross-correlation in
abnormal returns is set to 2.6%. The standard deviation of the abnormal returns is set to 17% per
month. Panel B presents results where the coeﬃcient on the lagged number of IPOs is increased from
0.8 to 0.95 compared to the default case. Panel C presents results where the coeﬃcient on the lagged
number of IPOs in increased from 0.8 to 0.95 and the eﬀect of the lagged 12-month moving average of
the S&P 500 return is increased from 8.438 to 16.876 compared to the default case. Panel D presents
results where the cross-correlations in abnormal returns are set to 15% (rather than 2.6%), remaining
the high persistence. The average number of IPOs in a month is comparable in all panels (about 30).
32Table VI: Simulation Results, Biases with a Pseudo Market Timing Eﬀect
1-Month Horizon 36-Month Horizon 60-Month Horizon
Measure 100 200 500 100 200 500 100 200 500
Panel A. Default Case
CAREW –0.02 –0.01 –0.01 –0.49 –0.33 –0.15 –0.58 –0.06 0.07
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24)
CARCW 0.00 –0.01 –0.01 –0.04 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.38 0.19
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.22) (0.23) (0.24)
ARFI –0.00 0.00 –0.00 0.09 –0.04 0.02 0.09 0.31 0.33
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.21) (0.22)
Panel B. High Persistence
CAREW –0.04 –0.05 –0.03 –1.04 –0.60 –0.41 –1.45 –1.25 –0.75
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.19) (0.22) (0.24) (0.28) (0.34)
CARCW 0.02 –0.02 –0.03 –0.12 –0.13 –0.12 –0.33 –0.24 –0.26
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25)
ARFI –0.00 –0.01 0.00 –0.18 0.09 0.11 –0.03 –0.18 –0.29
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.17) (0.21) (0.24)
Panel C. High Persistence and Large Pseudo Market Impact
CAREW –0.10 –0.08 –0.06 –1.77 –1.61 –0.84 –2.29 –2.12 –1.17
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.19) (0.23) (0.24) (0.28) (0.35)
CARCW 0.00 –0.02 –0.03 –0.21 –0.24 0.08 –0.18 –0.35 –0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.23) (0.25) (0.25)
ARFI 0.00 –0.00 0.00 0.14 –0.07 0.16 0.09 –0.15 –0.14
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.21) (0.24)
Panel D. High Persistence and Extreme Cross-Correlations
CAREW –0.29 –0.21 –0.15 –5.59 –4.60 –4.02 –6.02 –6.72 –4.74
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.37) (0.45) (0.56) (0.55) (0.67) (0.80)
CARCW –0.00 0.03 0.01 –0.82 –0.54 –0.64 0.16 –0.70 –1.53
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.33) (0.34) (0.33) (0.51) (0.54) (0.55)
ARFI 0.02 0.02 0.00 –0.18 –0.08 –0.45 0.89 0.16 –1.09
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.30) (0.32) (0.32) (0.41) (0.49) (0.53)
This table presents the average biases of the equally weighted cumulative abnormal return measure
(CAREW), the cross-sectionally weighted cumulative abnormal return measure (CARCW), and the
average abnormal return in the feasible investment strategy (ARFI) in simulations of an empirical
model for the number of IPOs but with the additional feature that lagged common components of
abnormal returns aﬀect the future number of IPOs. The biases are expressed in % over the horizon
of 1, 36, and 60 months with three diﬀerent sample sizes (100, 200, and 500 months). The number
of replications are 5,000, 2,500, and 1,000 for the three sample sizes. Below each bias estimate the
standard error is given within parenthesis. There are four diﬀerent set-ups. Panel A presents results
for the default case. Parameters for the conditional mean is from speciﬁcation (iii) in Table III, but
the lagged common component ct enters with a coeﬃcient of 5. The cross-correlation in abnormal
returns is set to 2.6%. The standard deviation of the abnormal returns is set to 17% per month.
Panel B presents results where the coeﬃcient on the lagged number of IPOs is increased from 0.8
to 0.95 compared to the default case. Panel C presents results where the coeﬃcient on the lagged
number of IPOs in increased from 0.8 to 0.95 and the eﬀect of the lagged common component of
abnormal returns is increased from 5 to 10 compared to the default case. Panel D presents results
where the cross-correlations in abnormal returns are set to 15% (rather than 2.6%), remaining the
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